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Abstract. Mobile ad hoc networks have received great attention in recent years, 
mainly due to the evolution of wireless networking and mobile computing 
hardware. Nevertheless, many inherent vulnerabilities exist in mobile ad hoc 
networks and their applications that affect the security of wireless transactions. 
As intrusion prevention mechanisms, such as encryption and authentication, are 
not sufficient we need a second line of defense, Intrusion Detection. In this pa-
per we present an intrusion detection engine based on neural networks and a 
protection method based on watermarking techniques. In particular, we exploit 
information visualization and machine learning techniques in order to achieve 
intrusion detection and we authenticate the maps produced by the application of 
the intelligent techniques using a novel combined watermarking embedding 
method. The performance of the proposed model is evaluated under different 
traffic conditions, mobility patterns and visualization metrics. 
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 1. Introduction 
Wireless communication is gaining adoption in a broad range of environments 
making essential the need for rapid proliferation of wireless networking technologies. 
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET), also called spontaneous networks, could be de-
fined as a collection of mobile nodes, which employ a multi-hop information transfer 
without relying in  an a-priori infrastructure. All nodes communicate in a self-
organized way and are able to appear and disappear from the network at any time. 
Mobile devices create a wireless communication channel and each of them contributes 
in the routing decisions of the network and the basic network services. Mobile nodes 
communicate directly with nodes in their vicinity and use intermediate nodes in order 
to exchange information with nodes out of their radio range. Cooperation is a substan-
tial requirement for the effective performance of the wireless ad hoc network. Because 
of the special advantages that wireless ad hoc networks present, they are envisioned in 
many critical applications including battlefields and disaster recovery applications. 
Although MANETs are characterised by great flexibility, they also present many 
inherent vulnerabilities that pose essential research challenges and unique security 
requirements. MANETs are characterized by a dynamically changing topology leading 
to a not well-defined boundary where access control mechanisms and firewalls can be 
applied. A MANET is susceptible to numerous threats including passive eavesdrop-
ping, spoofing and modification of information. Their vulnerability is further stressed 
by nodal interdependency and resource constraints including limited battery, band-
width and CPU use. 
Intrusion Detection is an invaluable mature arsenal with a long history of research 
for the defense of wired networks but is still in its infancy in the area of MANETs. In 
this paper we present an intrusion detection module that is part of a local IDS architec-
ture composed of a data collection engine, an intrusion detection engine and a re-
sponse engine. The focus of this paper is the proposal of the intrusion detection mod-
ule that is based on a type of neural networks known as emergent Self-Organizing 
Maps (eSOMs). Neural Networks have the great advantage of tolerance towards im-
precise data. We exploit this important feature of neural networks in order to classify 
normal against abnormal behavior in MANETs. Combining machine learning, infor-
mation visualization and watermarking techniques we are able to have a clear view of 
how secure a MANET is against attacks. In particular, each node of the MANET 
creates a map that depicts its security state and distributes this map to all its neighbor-
ing nodes. Thus, each node knows the security status of every neighbor by generating 
a global map. The global map is used in order to perform secure and efficient routing 
by avoiding paths that include nodes, which are victims of attacks.  
Furthermore, watermarking techniques are applied in order to protect the produced 
maps from modification. The proposed intrusion detection approach uses a combined 
watermarking technique that derives from Lattice and Block-Wise ([1], [2], [3]) meth-
ods. When local maps are broadcasted to the neighboring nodes, a cryptographic en-
coder and decoder can authenticate them. 
Neural Networks and watermarking techniques are two research areas with many 
advantages that have never been used before in the research area of MANET. We 
exploit their main advantages and we propose an intrusion detection module, which is 
part of a local IDS agent. Using eSOM, we to have a visual representation of the nor-
mal-attack state in each node of the MANET. Hence, each node can determine wheth-
er a neighboring node is under attack and forward its messages accordingly. Moreo-
ver, with watermarking techniques we can authenticate the nodes of the MANET and 
verify the integrity of the maps produced by eSOM. 
Following this introduction, the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
related work of intrusion detection approaches that have been proposed for mobile ad 
hoc networks and approaches that use watermarking techniques. Section 3 discusses 
the intrusion detection model this paper is based on. Section 4 presents a functional 
description of the proposed detection engine and the classification algorithm used. 
Section 5 presents the watermarking technique proposed for the authentication of 
maps produced by eSOMs. In section 6 the performance evaluation of the detection 
engine as well as the results of the proposed watermarking technique are presented. 
Finally section 7 concludes the paper and discusses some future work. 
2. Related Work 
Intrusion Detection is an active and mature research area for wired networks but 
techniques designed for wired networks may not be efficient if applied to wireless ad 
hoc networks due to the stringent requirements these networks present. Compared 
with wired networks where traffic monitoring is performed in gateways, routers and 
switches, wireless ad hoc network lack centralized choke points at which it would be 
possible to monitor network traffic. Even if we could achieve the existence of such 
concentration points, their locations would continuously change due to mobility. That 
is why the deployment of a distributed intrusion detection approach in wireless ad hoc 
networks is a necessity. Additionally, we should focus on security mechanisms keep-
ing in mind the ease of listening to wireless transactions, the lack of a fixed infrastruc-
ture and the resource consumption characteristics of MANET. This means that it is 
better to use a periodic intrusion detection system (IDS) than an ‘always-on’ preven-
tion mechanism. Moreover, the resource constraints that MANETs face including 
limited battery, bandwidth and frequent miscommunication complicate the discrimina-
tion between a new qualified operation after a disconnection and an intrusion. Some-
thing that makes even more difficult the classification between normal and anomaly 
behavior. 
Zhang and Lee [4] proposed the first (high-level) IDS approach specific for ad hoc 
networks. They proposed a distributed and cooperative anomaly based IDS, which 
provides an efficient guide for the design of IDS in wireless ad hoc networks. They 
focused on an anomaly detection approach based on routing updates, on the MAC 
layer and on the mobile application layer. 
Huang and Lee [5] extended their previous work by proposing a cluster-based IDS, 
in order to combat the resource constraints that MANETs face. They use a set of sta-
tistical features that can be derived from routing tables and apply the classification 
decision tree induction algorithm C 4.5 in order to detect normal vs. abnormal behav-
ior. The proposed system is able to identify the source of the attack, if the identified 
attack occurs within one hop. 
Deng et al. [6] proposed a hierarchically distributed and a completely distributed 
intrusion detection approach. The intrusion detection approach used in both of these 
architectures focuses on the network layer and it is based on a Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM) classification algorithm. They use a set of parameters derived from the 
network layer and suggest that a hierarchically distributed approach may be a more 
promising solution versus a completely distributed intrusion detection approach. 
Kachirski and Guha [7] proposed a cluster-based intrusion detection system built 
on a mobile agent framework. The proposed system uses mobile agents each perform-
ing a particular role, either monitoring, or decision or action. A few nodes are chosen 
by a distributed algorithm in order to host sensors for the monitoring of network pack-
ets and agents in order to make the decisions. Additionally, all the nodes host sensors 
for host-based monitoring. The main advantage of this approach is that the packet-
monitoring task is limited in a few nodes and the IDS-related processing time by each 
node is minimized. 
Liu et al. [8] proposed a completely distributed anomaly detection approach. They 
investigated the use of the MAC layer in order to profile normal behavior of mobile 
nodes and then apply cross-feature analysis [9] on feature vectors constructed from the 
training data. 
Tseng et al. [10] proposed a distributed and specification based intrusion detection 
approach in order to detect attacks in the AODV routing protocol. The approach in-
volves the use of finite state machines. More specifically correct AODV routing be-
havior is specified using finite state machines and the actual behavior of AODV flows 
is compared with these specifications. Any deviation from these specifications is rec-
ognized as intrusion. Specification based techniques have the drawback that it is nec-
essary to balance the tradeoff between complexity and accuracy. 
Anjum et al. [11] proposed a signature based intrusion detection approach for wire-
less ad hoc networks based on the assumption that attack signatures are completely 
known in an ad hoc network.  This approach investigates the ability of various routing 
protocols to facilitate the intrusion detection procedure. The authors show that reac-
tive ad-hoc routing protocols are less effective than proactive routing protocols in the 
detection of intrusions even in the absence of mobility. 
Chen et al. [12] proposed a distributed intrusion detection approach based on the 
Dempster-Shafer theory. They exploit the main advantages of this theory and its abil-
ity to reflect uncertainty or a lack of complete information and the convenient numeri-
cal procedure for fusing together multiple pieces of data. 
Watermarking has been used extensively in the research area of information securi-
ty. More specifically, in the area of intrusion detection Wang et al. [13] proposed a 
framework for intrusions detection in wired networks where watermarking and tracing 
of the packets to the attacker’s source IP address is activated, only if the IDS subsys-
tem has determined that there is an attack in progress.  
Páez et al. [14] proposed a security scheme for Intrusion Detection Systems based 
on Cooperative Itinerant Agents (CIA). They proposed a new security scheme in order 
to verify the entities’ integrity of an Intrusion Detection System based on mobile co-
operative agents using watermarking software techniques. More specifically, they 
propose the use of fingerprinting software in order to differentiate agents of the same 
kind and to detect more sophisticated attacks. 
Despite the important advantages that watermarking techniques present no applica-
tion of watermarking techniques in the area of securing ad hoc networks has been 
proposed. In this paper we use watermarking in combination with Emergent Self Or-
ganizing Maps in order to ensure that the exploitation of the information visualization 
that eSOM provide will not be altered by malicious attackers. In MANETs the re-
sponse to possible attacks should be quick as the resources constraints make the secu-
rity issue an even more difficult task, as the impact of a possible intrusion would be 
even more severe. This means that information visualization can help us in order to 
have a direct response in possible intrusions. Each node has the option to select a 
secure neighbor node and not one that could be a possible subject of an attack in order 
to forward its information.  
3. Proposed Intrusion Detection Model 
 Malicious nodes in a mobile ad hoc network may target to exploit features of the 
physical, network or MAC layers. The majority of the security approaches in such 
networks have focused in the network layer. Little research has been done on the 
MAC layer security. The role of the MAC layer in wireless ad hoc networks is 
substantial as it is responsible for maintaining the communication between nodes and 
the scheduling of the access in a shared radio channel. 
The MAC layer is directly affected by almost every intrusion [8], since it is placed 
in the first layers of the protocol stack. Indeed, the data delivery ratio, or the through-
put, may be affected by malicious behavior or misuse of the shared medium (e.g., 
selfishness) due to increased routing load. The control overhead for each delivered 
data packet may also increase. Thus, intrusion detection mechanisms that are based on 
features selected in the MAC layer are faster regarding the detection delays and the 
response time. Furthermore, these features make the discrimination between normal 
and abnormal behavior easier. 
The architecture of the IDS applied to MANET could be either distributed and co-
operative or distributed and hierarchical. The distributed and hierarchical IDSs are 
based on dividing the mobile ad hoc network in clusters. Although cluster-based IDSs 
have the advantage of lower detection workload, the procedure of creating clusters 
and electing cluster heads may cause a great overhead. Moreover, the existence of 
cluster heads and the obvious possibility of their exploitation by malicious attackers 
lead to the weakness of fictitious security. Furthermore the distributed hierarchical 
IDSs are more efficient for ad hoc networks with low mobility. Thus, the cooperative 
and dynamic nature of MANETs implies that the intrusion detection system should be 
distributed and cooperative. The lack of central monitoring nodes and the lack of trust 
between peer nodes of a wireless ad hoc network render a central intrusion detection 
system impractical.  
Each node of the MANET should perform its local intrusion detection using local 
audit data. When the confirmation of other nodes to detect an attack is necessary, local 
intrusion detectors should cooperate. Furthermore, this cooperation between local 
intrusion detectors should be held through secure channels. 
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       Fig. 1 Intrusion Detection Architecture 
The IDS architecture we adopt is composed of multiple local IDS agents as illus-
trated in Figure 1 that are responsible for detecting possible intrusions locally [4]. The 
collection of all the independent IDS agents forms the IDS system for the MANET. 
Each local IDS agent is composed of the following components:  
Data Collector: is responsible for selecting local audit data and activity logs. 
Detection engine: is responsible for detecting local anomalies using local audit da-
ta. The local anomaly detection is performed using the eSOM classification algorithm.  
The procedure that is followed in the local detection engine is the one described be-
low: 
• Select labeled audit data and perform the appropriate transformations. 
• Compute the classifier using training data and the eSOM algorithm. 
• Apply the classifier to test local audit data in order to classify it as Normal 
or Abnormal. 
• Perform watermarking in its eSOM map, in order to be sure that it will not 
be modified and in order to illustrate the security situation and possible 
existence of intrusions locally in this node.  
Additionally, each node selects the eSOM maps of its neighbors and uses them in 
order to have a view about the security of its neighbors something that can be easily 
derived by the visual observation of the watermarked (not modified) maps produced 
by eSOM. After selecting the local maps from its neighbors each node creates the 
global map of its network consisted of all the local maps and performs watermarking 
on it. Thus each node is able to know the security status of its local network.  
EH
C A
D
B
G
F
I
Communication 
range of node C
SO Map
Node B
SO Map
Node A
W2
W1
SO Map
Node C
SO Map
Node D
SO Map
Node G
W4
W5
W3
SO Map
Node G
SO Map
Node C
SO Map
Node B
SO Map
Node A
SO Map
Node B
W1 W2
W3 W4
W5
GLOBAL MAP
W
 
Fig. 2 Watermarked Emergent Self-Organized Maps of a MANET. 
In Figure 2, nodes A, B, D and G are in the communication range of node C. Each 
node A, B, C, D, G creates its own eSOM u-Matrix and performs watermarking on it 
(illustrated as W1, W2, W3, W4, W5 respectively). Node C selects the local water-
marked eSOM u-Matrixes from its neighbors and creates the global map of its local 
network. By observing the global map of its local network, node C is able to have a 
view of the security status of its neighboring nodes. Based on this information it se-
lects the appropriate node in order to forward its messages. Node C, in order to verify 
the authenticity and integrity of the global map, performs also watermarking on the 
global map (illustrated as W). Observing the local maps of all its neighboring nodes 
and by considering as secure the nodes that are not victims of attacks perform the 
selection of the appropriate node for the forwarding of messages; their maps do not 
illustrate the existence of attack. In the case where all nodes are victims of an attack, 
the node that is considered to be able to forward information is the one that forwards 
the messages. 
Response Engine: If the Detection engine detects an intrusion then the Response 
engine is activated. The Response Engine is responsible for sending a local and a 
global alarm in order to notify the nodes of the mobile ad hoc network about the inci-
dent of intrusion. Moreover, in case that an intrusion is detected though the local 
eSOM map of a node then the attacked node is not selected for forwarding infor-
mation in order to avoid possible loss of information. Special attention should be paid 
on the function of the Response engine in order to avoid possible flooding caused by 
the notification messages of intrusion. Thus, the broadcasted notification of intrusion 
is restricted to a few hops away from the node where the anomaly has been detected 
since the neighboring nodes run the greatest risk of possible intrusion.  
4. Detection Engine based on Emergent Self-Organizing Maps  
Kohonen’s Self-Organizing Maps [15] have their base in biology. They belong in 
the category of unsupervised or competitive learning networks and produce a topolog-
ical map, which illustrates the input data according to their similarity. The Self Organ-
izing map is trained using only the characteristics of the trained data. The trained 
KSOMs create clusters of data, where similar vectors of features are located in a spe-
cific region in the output space. This is very useful for discovering clusters and rela-
tionships in data. The generated mapping is topology preserving. 
The learning procedure is composed of the following steps: 
a. Initialize the random weights wij (also known as codebook vectors of 
the neurons) with small random values. 
b. Use an input pattern x. 
c. Calculate the Euclidean distance (eq. 1 [15]) between input data sample 
x, and each neuron weight wij. The winner (Best Matching Unit) is cho-
sen as o(x): 
,minarg)( ij
j
wxxo −=    j=1,2,…,l,  (1) 
d. Adjust all the weights in the neighborhood, in order to achieve the topo-
logical mapping, depending on their distance from the winning neuron 
according to the following equation [11]: 
))1()(()()()1(: −−⋅′+−∀ twtxttatwj ijiij η    (2), 
where α is the learning rate, η the neighborhood function and t’ the time 
that was spent in the current context. The neighborhood function η de-
creases as t’ increases. 
e. Repeat steps b, c, d until convergence 
Something that is often neglected in KSOM is that self-organization allows the 
emergence of structure in the data. According to [16], “Emergence is the ability of a 
system to produce a phenomenon on a new, higher level”. In order to achieve emer-
gence the existence and cooperation of a great number of elementary processes is 
necessary. Emergence may be presented not only in natural but also in technical sys-
tems. One of the basic disadvantages of SOM maps is that their abilities are limited to 
a few neurons. On the other hand, emergent Self-Organizing Maps may expand to 
some thousands neurons. A large number of neurons in eSOM are necessary in order 
to achieve emergence. The cooperation of such a big number of neurons leads to 
structures of a higher level. The clustering procedure in emergent SOMs is performed 
by observing the whole Emergent Self-Organizing Map and not by focusing on its 
neurons.  
We have used the distance based (U-Matrix) method in order to visualize the struc-
tures generated by eSOMs. According to this method [16] the sum (height) of distanc-
es between the neuron-weights represented as elevation of each neuron. Thus, its 
neighbors are normalized by the largest height. The result of the sum of distances is 
represented as elevation of each neuron. The input data set is displayed and depicted 
at a 3D landscape. The height will have a large value in areas of the map where few 
data points belong and small in areas that represent clusters, creating hills and valleys 
correspondingly. The height (uh(ni)) of each neuron (ni) is given by the following 
equation (eq.3) [17]: 
( ) ∑=
∈ ij Un
jii nndnuh ),(    (3), 
where Ui  represent the neighbor neurons of ni. 
We trained Emergent SOMs with logs of network traffic selected from a simulated 
mobile ad hoc network (using ns-2) and used eSOM U-matrices [17] in order to per-
form intrusion detection. In our case, a vector represents each log of network traffic 
with some fixed attributes. Each vector has a unique spatial position in the U-Matrix 
and the distance between two points is the dissimilarity of two network traffic logs. 
The U-Matrix of the trained dataset is divided into valleys that represent clusters of 
normal or attack data and hills that represent borders between clusters. Depending on 
the position of the best match of an input data point that characterizes a connection 
this point may belong to a valley (cluster (normal or attack behavior)) or this data 
point may not be classified if its best match belongs to a hill (boundary). The map that 
will be created after the training of the Emergent SOM, will represent the network 
traffic. Thus an input data point may be classified depending on the position of its best 
match.  
Considering the fact that image maps are exposed to the possibility of manipula-
tion, watermarking techniques could be applied to eSOM maps in order to verify the 
authenticity and detect any modifications of the maps. By using watermarking tech-
niques suspicious parts of images for illegal alterations and modifications could be 
located. 
5. Protecting eSOM maps with Watermarking Techniques 
Watermarking techniques attempt to protect the copyrights of any digital medium 
by embedding a unique message within the original information [1]. The embedding 
method involves the use of a number of different authentication, encryption and hash 
algorithms to achieve the integrity and copy protection of the particular message. We 
use watermarking techniques for eSOM U-Matrixes, which are in the form of images 
in uncompressed format (Bmp). We use the Lattice and the Block-Wise embedding 
methods. The Lattice method has two parameters, alpha0 (lattice spacing) and beta 
(embedding strength) while the Block-Wise method has only one parameter alpha 
(quantization factor). We combined these two watermarking techniques in order to 
implement a cryptographic encoder-decoder that can be used in order to authenticate 
the nodes in the MANET. 
One of the most important requirements of watermarking is the perceptual transpar-
ency between the original work and the watermarked. In particular for images objec-
tive metrics are widely used. The watermark message may have a higher or lower 
level of perceptibility, meaning that there is a greater or lesser likelihood that a given 
observer will perceive the difference between the watermarked and not watermarked 
image in our case the eSOM u-Matrix.  
For fair comparison between the original and the watermarked work there are effi-
cient distortion metrics [3]. Objective criteria are trust worthier in comparison with 
subjective and they are commonly used in the research and development environment. 
These distortion metrics do not exploit the properties of the human visual system 
(HVS) but they provide reliable results. Also there is an objective criterion that relies 
on the sensitivity of the eye and is called Watson perceptual distance. It is also known 
as just noticeable differences (JND) and consists of a sensitivity function, two mask-
ing components based on luminance and contrast masking, and a pooling component. 
Table 1 gives the metrics that are used more often. 
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The test image is in bitmap format, grayscale and has an 800x600 resolution. In or-
der to use the formulas of Table 1 and to have a view how much is the difference 
between the original and the watermarked image it was necessary to evaluate the ideal 
values. Supposing that the original and the watermarked image are exactly identical 
the produced values are presented in Table 2. The test image is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Table 2. Ideal Values of the test Image 
Quality Measure-
 
Ideal 
 MSE 0 
SNR (dB) 94 
PSNR (dB) 110 
IF 100 
NC 1 
CQ 138.178 
Watson Distance 0 
 
 
Fig 3. Test Image -Emergent SOM U-Matrix of a node of a MANET 
 
In the following paragraphs the Lattice and the Block-Wise embedding methods are 
described and how their combination is applied to watermark the eSOM u-Matrixes. 
5.1 Lattice Embedding Method   
In a lattice code, each code word is a point on a regular lattice. The points in a sim-
ple N-dimensional lattice can be constructed by adding integer multiples of N distinct 
vectors. So each message mark, wm is a point in a lattice and is the sum of one or more 
reference marks wr. 
The reference marks are orthogonal to one another. The integer that describes the 
closest code word to any message vector is calculated, by first finding the length of the 
message vector projected onto reference mark, and then by diving it by the length and 
quantizing it to the nearest vector. The lattice watermarking system embeds only one 
bit per 256 pixels in an image. Each bit is encoded using trellis code and produces 
sequence of four bits. The trellis coding is a convolutional code, the number of states 
is 23=8 and the possible outputs are 24=16. So after the encoding procedure, the bits 
have to be embedded in 256 pixels. This means that each of the four bits is embedded 
in 256/4=64 pixels. The image is divided in blocks of 8x8 pixels in order to host the 
bits. The reference pattern is constructed consisting of 8x8 random pixels and the 
pixel values are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance. Each bit is embed-
ded by correlating a block against the 8x8 reference pattern, and quantizing the result 
to an odd or even integer. The pattern that is added to the 8x8 block according to the 
index of the closest point in the sublattice (zm[i]) is computed by the following formu-
las 
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where ci is the ith block of the image, wr is the reference pattern and l[i] is the length of 
the ci projected onto wr 
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where mc is the corresponding message 
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where wαi is the added pattern. 
The parameters in the embedding process are: α (aplha0) that represents the em-
bedding strength and β (beta) that represents the lattice spacing. At the decoder size 
the z[i] is first computed by equation 7 and then the least significant bit of it is detect-
ed. The coded message is then decoded with the trellis decoder. 
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5.2 Block-Wise Embedding Method 
The Block-Wise method involves the basic properties of the JPEG compression 
where DCT domain takes place. Both the encoder and the decoder use these proper-
ties in order to achieve the embedding and the extraction process respectively. The 
predefined parameters are a strength parameter α (alpha), which is used as the scaling 
factor of the luminance quantization matrix. 
Four bits are embedded in the high-frequency DCT of each 8x8 (64 pixels) block in 
the image. In the lattice the number of bits, which can be embedded, is one bit per 256 
pixels. It seems that using the Block-Wise method the image can host 16 times more 
information. As it was mentioned the embedding takes place in the high-frequency 
DCT coefficients and not in the low-frequency in order to avoid any visual differences 
that would lead to unacceptably poor fidelity. Specifically 28 coefficients are used 
which means that each bit is embedded in seven coefficients. 
The seven coefficients that are going to host one bit are chosen randomly according 
to a seed number (see Equation 8).  So each coefficient is involved in only one bit. 
Next step is to divide each coefficient by its corresponding quantization factor and 
round to the nearest integer. 
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where q[i] is the corresponding value of the luminance matrix. 
Then the algorithm takes the least significant bit of the resulting seven CI[i] integers 
and exclusive-or then to obtain a bit value be. The bit value, which has to be embed-
ded, is b. In case that be ≠ b choose one of the seven integers CI[i], according which 
one will cause the least fidelity impact, and flip it. Let CwI[i] denote the result. That is 
CwI[i]=CI[i] for all I in case of be=b unless be ≠ b, in which case the least significant 
bit of one member of the seven CwI[i] is multiplied by the corresponding quantization 
factors to obtain the watermarked versions of the DCT coefficients. The equation is 
given by 
 
][][][ iCiaqiC wIw = . (9) 
 
At the decoder the procedure is exactly the same. From each 8x8 block the least 
significant bit be is extracted from each of the seven coefficients and is compared with 
the embedded one b. If they are different, the corresponding block is not authenticated 
and is marked as corrupted. 
5.3 Combined Method 
The lattice algorithm uses error control coding and its functionality is based on 
constructing orthogonal reference marks to be used in the embedding process. But in 
case that somebody modifies a number of blocks, the decoder will not detect it since it 
uses trellis coding. Of course if a continuous number of blocks have been changed, the 
decoder will not be able to extract the correct sequence of bits. The algorithm embeds 
one bit per 256 pixels.  Also the quality of the watermarked image is very high, as it 
will be discussed in the result sections. On the other hand the block-wise method em-
beds four bits per 64 pixels. The payload that can be hosted is larger, in comparison 
with the lattice, and it is very useful in low-resolution images. But the quality of the 
produced image is not so good. The user can exploit the absence of error control. Any 
modification of the watermarked image can be located by comparing the extracted 
message with the original. Questions of whom and why modified the image can be 
answered easily. So in cases where both the quality and the ability to notice the cor-
rupted blocks have the same importance, it is essentially to combine the two embed-
ding methods.  
The combination of the two embedding methods is implemented in a cryptographic 
encoder-decoder. Then we use a unique feature of the image. This can be anything 
that characterizes the specific image. As a unique description we used the sum of the 
pixel values of the four blocks in the corners. These entire three messages are inserted 
in a hash function and then the value is encrypted with a 1024-bit secret key. The 
signature with the short and the extended description are embedded with the lattice 
method while the message is embedded with the Block-Wise algorithm. The design of 
the encoder is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3 Cryptographic Encoder 
 
From the watermarked version of the image, at the decoder’s side, the signature, the 
short and the unique description are extracted with the Lattice method while the mes-
sage is extracted with the Block-Wise method. The unique description is evaluated 
again but this time of the watermarked version of the work, and is compared with the 
extracted one. So the first step is to verify if the unique descriptions match. In case of 
copying the watermark and embedding it in another image, the extracted description 
will not be the same. Because the pixel values of the image have been slightly changed 
to host the watermark, the extracted description cannot be exactly the same, but only 
very close. Therefore some upper and lower boundaries have been determined for this 
step of verification. The next step is to decrypt the signature using the 1024-bit public 
key and get the hash value. The message, the short description and the unique descrip-
tion that have been extracted, consist again in the hash function. The obtained hash 
value is then compared with the one decrypted from the signature. The second step of 
the decoder is to verify if the decrypted hash value matches exactly with the one calcu-
lated at the decoder. If both the stages of the hash values and the unique descriptions 
are valid, the authentication process is successful. The whole design of the decoder is 
presented in the Figure 4. 
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6. Performance Evaluation 
6.1 Detection Engine results 
To evaluate the feasibility of our intrusion detection engine we have conducted a 
series of experiments. For our experiments we have made some assumptions. The 
network has no preexisting infrastructure and the ad hoc routing protocol that was 
employed is AODV. 
We implemented the simulator within the ns-2 library. Our simulation modeled a 
network of 50 hosts placed randomly within an 1800 × 1000m2 area. Each node has a 
radio propagation range of 250 meters and channel capacity was 2 Mb/s. The nodes in 
the simulation move according to the ‘random way point’ model. At the start of the 
simulation, each node waits for a pause time, then randomly selects and moves to-
wards a destination with a speed uniformly lying between zero and the maximum 
speed. On reaching this destination it pauses again and repeats the above procedure till 
the end of the simulation. The minimum and maximum speed is set to 0 and 10 m/s, 
respectively, and pause times at 0, 20, 50, 70 and 200 sec. A pause time of 0 sec cor-
responds to the continuous motion of the node and a pause time of 200 sec corre-
sponds to the time that the node is stationary.  
We evaluated the performance of our proposed intrusion detection module for 5, 
10, 15 and 20 malicious nodes. In each case the number of all nodes in the network is 
set to 50. The malicious behavior is carried between 50 and 200 sec. The nodes per-
form normally between 0 and 50 sec. These parameters result in a network with rather 
high mobility and high traffic activity.      
Twenty, on average, traffic generators were developed to simulate TCP data rate to 
ten destination nodes. This traffic pattern results in twenty connections among source 
and destination nodes. The sending packets have random sizes and exponential inter-
arrival times. The sources and the destinations are randomly selected with uniform 
probabilities. The mean size of the data payload was 512 bytes. Each run is executed 
for 200 sec of simulation time with a feature-sampling interval of one sec. We used 
the IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) as the medium access 
control protocol. The mobility of the nodes is random determined by scenario files 
that are generated by the scene generator of ns-2. A free space propagation model with 
a threshold cutoff was used in our experiments. In the radio model, we assumed the 
ability of a radio to lock onto a sufficiently strong signal in the presence of interfering 
signals, i.e., radio capture. 
In our experiments we have simulated a constant selective packet-dropping attack 
where the attacker simply discards all data packets while it functions legitimately 
concerning routing and MAC layer packets. This type of attack is extremely difficult 
to detect if we consider that packet dropping is due to a malicious behavior or mobili-
ty. To add to the problem the malicious node may exhibit malicious behavior when it 
is most advantageous to him and not from the beginning of the traffic.  
The statistical features we have used have been introduced by Liu et al. [10] in 
their proposed approach for performing intrusion detection in the MAC layer. These 
features are as follows:  
• Network allocation vector (NAV): it’s a node specific characteristic, which 
depicts the time that the node will occupy the medium for sending its mes-
sages.  
• Transmission traffic rate: indicates the rate of the transmitted packets.   
• Reception traffic rate: indicates the rate of the received packets. 
• Retransmission rates of RTS packets: indicates the rate of the ReadyToSend 
packets that are retransmitted by the monitoring node. A high value of this 
feature suggests a possible packet dropping attack.    
• Retransmission rates of DATA packets: indicates the rate of the data packets 
that are retransmitted by the monitoring node. A high value of this feature 
suggests a possible packet dropping attack.   
• Active neighbor node count: represents the number of neighbor nodes that 
have data transmission activities.   
• Forwarding node count: represents the number of neighbor nodes that com-
municate directly with the monitoring node.  
In order to avoid having a great influence of the attributes of some input vectors it 
is necessary to normalize the input data. Many methods are used for the data normali-
zation. We have normalized the data with mean zero and variance one, a technique 
that produces very good results in most cases as reported in the literature.  For the 
evaluation we have used the Databionics eSOM tool ([18], [19]).  
The presented evaluation proves that we can achieve a differentiation between 
normal and abnormal behaviors concerning packet-dropping attacks. In order to per-
form clustering with eSOM U-Matrices we followed the proceeding procedure. The 
best matches of the trained dataset and thus the corresponding dataset are manually 
grouped into clusters representing normal and attack behavior. Thus, we identify the 
regions of the map that represent a cluster that can be used for the classification on 
new datasets. The eSOM of a trained dataset is depicted in Figure 3. As it can be 
clearly seen the training data set has been divided in two classes that are very well 
distinguished, normal data class (dark color) and packet dropping data class (light 
color). In order to make sure that our intrusion detection engine will always provide 
efficient and accurate results we should update our trained eSOM U-matrix according 
to the new conditions concerning mobility. 
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed intrusion detection engine we 
use two measures the Detection rate and the False alarm rate: 
Detection rate =
FNTP
TP
+
, False alarm rate=
FPTN
FP
+
, where TP is the number 
of true positives (attack logs classified as attacks), TN the number of true negatives 
(normal logs classified as normal), FP the number of false positives (normal logs 
classified as attacks) and FN the number of false negatives (attack logs classified as 
normal). The most effective approach should reduce as much as possible the False 
alarm rate and at the same time increase the Detection rate. 
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Fig 6. Detection Rate vs. Pause Time 
 
Figure 6 presents the average Detection rate of the all source nodes that present traf-
fic activity and are recognized as normal or attack by eSOM regarding the used pause 
times. The detection rate seems not to be influenced by the mobility and in all cases to 
be over 80%. For long pause times the rate slightly lessens which is due to the TCP 
traffic and the degradation of the mobility. Indeed, a TCP agent stops sending data 
packets when it doesn’t receive acknowledgment. Even after AODV discovers a new 
path to that destination, the agent keeps sending data packets through the malicious 
node, as the latter respond normally to control packets. As the network exhibits a 
rather low mobility, traffic always is rejected by the malicious node and soon stopped 
by the TCP agent, which degrades the audit data fed to eSOM.   
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Fig 7. Detection Rate vs. Number of Malicious Nodes 
 
The detection rate as a function of the number of malicious nodes is presented in 
Figure 7. The rate is rather high and, as in the previous figures, always over 80%. 
When few malicious nodes exist in the network the connections that are influenced by 
them are also a few since source nodes move randomly in the network. This results in 
duplicated lines in the audit data set, which is fed to eSOM thus the decrease in the 
detection rate. When the number of malicious nodes is high compared to the number 
of source nodes, the TCP connections generated automatically by NS are a few, which 
leads to multiple duplicate lines in the audit data that is fed to eSOM, which explains 
the decrement in the detection rate. TCP traffic is used as a more realistic one. Anoth-
er data traffic type (e.g. CBR) is under future investigation. 
 
Table 3. False Alarms vs. Pause Time 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. False Alarms vs. Number  of  Mobile Nodes 
Malicious 
nodes 
False Alarm (%) 
5 26 
Pause time (sec) False Alarm 
(%) 
0 21 
20 20 
50 22 
70 20 
10 22 
15 17 
20 21 
 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the average false alarm rate as a function of the paused 
times used and the number of malicious nodes, respectively. When a source node 
generates traffic to different destinations and one of these connections is influenced by 
malicious nodes, then eSOM finds it difficult to distinguish among normal and abnor-
mal traffic. If this is combined with multiple duplicate lines in the audit data due to 
mobility, the malicious node number produces rather high False alarm rates.  The high 
values of false alarm rates are combated by the activation of the Response Engine, 
which is able to indicate if the alarm has been triggered by a malicious node or be-
cause of mobility issues. 
Two representative works in the area of anomaly detection is Deng’s et al [6] and 
Liu’s et al [8]. Deng et al [6] in their anomaly detection approach in MANETs they 
propose the use of SVM (Support vector Machines) in a completely distributed archi-
tecture and the false alarm rate range from 3.5±5.8% to 20.85±8.03% for Black hole 
attack and Frequent False Routing Requesting (FFRR) attack. 
Moreover Liu et al [8] in their approach for packet dropping attack using cross fea-
ture analysis although the false alarm rate is low 0.29% the detection rate is also rather 
low 72%. As packet-dropping attack is a rather difficult attack to combat the low false 
alarm is combined with low detection rate.  
Our intrusion detection engine presents rather high detection rate and its main ad-
vantage is the visual representation of normal-attack state in a mobile ad hoc network. 
Moreover our intrusion detection engine has the ability for immediate response in case 
of possible intrusion by selecting the more secure node as indicated by its u-Matrix 
map for forwarding the information. In order to verify the reliability and possible 
alteration of the maps the novel watermarking we propose is used. 
6.2 Watermarking Results 
In order to evaluate the performance and the efficiency of the embedding methods, 
excessive tests took place. By understanding the results a clearer idea of the code 
operation can be acquired as well as a better understanding of the principles behind it. 
A number of cases will be considered each with a different variable parameter. First 
the impact of the lattice algorithm on the image quality will be shown. Then the results 
using the block-wise method are going to be illustrated and finally the section will 
conclude with the observations using a combination of the embedding methods. 
6.2.1 Lattice Embedding Method 
 
In the case of the lattice algorithm the maximum number of the embedded bit can 
be 400 (one bit per 256 pixels). The formulas that are used to evaluate the differences 
between two images were presented in the Table 1. The tests were executed for a 
range of the parameter’s values in order to conclude what the best values are. The 
parameters are the embedding strength (β) and the lattice spacing (α). The range of the 
α value was from 0.35 to 5.33 and the range of β from 0.7 to 1.1. The incensement 
steps for a was 0.02 and for β 0.1. The measurement values for the lattice method are 
very close to the ideals. More specifically the direction towards zero is achieved using 
low values of α in case of MSE. If at the same time the value of β that is used is low, 
the MSE is decreased even further. In the case of SNR and PSNR, the result values 
are higher when the parameters α and β are low. The image fidelity (IF) is defined as a 
percentage of how identical the images are. So the value of 100% is considered to be 
the optimum and as can be noticed from the graphs, the results are very close to this. 
Utilizing the NC and CQ quality measurements, it is observed that their measurements 
are closer to ideal ones, as the values of α and β are decreased. Finally all the above 
observations are also justified from the Watson measurement which is based on lumi-
nance, contrast, and pooling masking. 
Therefore somebody could suggest that the optimum parameter values are those 
that give the best results. They could be even the zero values. But at the decoder’s side 
not all the bits are extracted right. Specifically using low values of α and β the decoder 
is not able to get the right embedded bits. In conclusion it can be said that a trade-off 
between the quality results and the decoder’s result is necessary in order to determine 
the optimum values. From the tests we concluded that suggested values could be 
α≈0.8 and β=0.9. In Table 5 are given some evaluated values of the experiments in 
order to justify all the above notices. The watermarked version of the test image pre-
sents no noticeable difference from the test image. 
Table 5. Result of the Lattice Method 
Lattice MSE SNR PSNR IF NC CQ Watson Right 
Bits 
α=0.35, 
β=1.0 
0.019 64.49 70.21 100 1 137.04 8.144 370 
α=1.01, 
β=0.9 
0.27 51.84 56.72 99.996 1 136.97 21.178 400 
α=1.85, 
β=0.8 
0.97 49.97 53.12 99.993 1 136.97 51.687 400 
 
6.2.2 Block-Wise Embedding Method 
In the case of the Block-Wise method, the tests were executed for the same image 
in order to be comparable with those for the Lattice method. One major difference is 
the number of bits that are embedded. Since the method embeds four bits in every 64 
pixels and the image has 102500 pixels in total, the number of bits can be hosted in 
6406. The size of the information that can be watermarked is significantly higher and 
in fact is 16 times more than the size for Lattice method. So before even executing the 
test it is expected that the results will not be as good. The information is in this case 
much more, which means that the alterations in the image will produce worse values 
of the quality measurements. The only parameter in the Block-Wise methods is that 
which is responsible for the quantization of the luminance matrix and is called alpha 
(α). 
The observation of the results proves what is being stated at the beginning. The 
values of the quality measurements are not as good in comparison with those from the 
lattice method. The measurement of the MSE is higher than the zero value, which is 
ideal. The values of the SNR and PSNR, which are used widely, show that as the val-
ue of the parameter alpha (α) is increased the result becomes worse. In the case of the 
IF, NC, CQ, the measurements seem to be distant from the ideal values as alpha takes 
higher values. The same conclusion can be phrased for the perceptual distance given 
from the Watson model, where the results are worse as the value of alpha (α) is in-
creased. Some values of the quality measurements are given in Table 6. 
Table 6. Results of the Block-Wise Method 
Block-
Wise 
MSE SNR PSNR IF NC CQ Watson Right 
bits 
α=0.03 0.312 44.11 62.18 99.9981 0.99997 138.9 12.144 6012 
α=0.16 4.324 36.22 52.32 99.9701 0.99988 137.902 108.972 6406 
α=0.33 11.321 31.45 44.29 99.8926 0.99978 137.123 309.456 6406 
 
According to the above paragraph it seems that as the value of alpha is increased, 
the watermarked image has poorer fidelity. So the optimum value of the parameter 
could be possibly a small one e.g. 0.01. But it seems that values below 0.01. But it 
seems that values below 0.05 do no allow the decoder to get the right message. The 
chosen value of alpha depends on how sensitive the method the user wants it to be in 
order to locate the corrupted bits and mark the corresponding blocks. Higher values 
increase the sensitivity but at the same time the quality of the image is reduced. So it is 
again necessary to make a trade-off between the results and the sensitivity. A possible 
suggested value could be α≈0.2. The watermarked version of the original image pro-
duced with the Block-Wise method has no visible difference from the test image, 
which is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
6.2.3 Combined Method 
 
In order to perform watermarking in the eSOM u-Matrixes we exploit the ad-
vantages of the two embedding methods, the Lattice and the Block-Wise method. The 
Lattice algorithm provides high quality of the watermarked image but the numbers of 
bits that is embedded in only one bit per 256 pixels. On the other hand, the Block-
Wise method embeds four bits per 64 pixels but with the cost of poor quality of the 
produced image. Furthermore, the absence of error control in the Block-Wise method 
gives us the advantage of being able to easily locate any alterations of the water-
marked image. 
In eSOM u-Matrixes the part that is likely to be illegally altered is watermarked 
with the Block-Wise method while the rest of the image is watermarked with the lat-
tice method. This means that the areas in the eSOM u-Matrix that are illustrated in 
Figure 5 with the light color and represent the attack data class in our case the packet 
dropping data class will be watermarked with the Block-Wise method while the rest of 
the eSOM u-Matrix (the normal data class (dark color)) with the lattice method. This 
way, we are able to have a high quality image and at the same time if an adversary 
changes for example the area of attack data class the combined algorithm is able to 
determine the modified pixels. This is achieved by comparing the extracted message 
with the original. 
The message is embedded in the part of the image that is watermarked with the 
block-wise method, while the signature, the short and the extracted description in the 
large part of the image. The experimental results of the quality measurements were 
executed again in order to investigate the results. Since the lattice method gives better 
results than the block-wise, it is expected that the produced result values would be in 
between the values of those produced by the two methods. Indeed the results were not 
as good as those of the Lattice’s but at the same time better than those of the Block-
Wise’s. In Table 7 some results of the combination are given in order to compare 
them with those of the two methods when they are used individually. The table justi-
fies that the combination produces quality measurements between the two methods. 
 
Table 7. Result values of the Combined Embedding Methods 
 
alpha0=0.93, 
beta=1.0,   
alpha=0.1 
Lattice 
alpha0, beta 
Block-Wise 
alpha 
Combined 
alpha0,beta,alpha 
MSE 0.385     1.785     0.394   
SNR 44.2     40.45     45.74     
PSNR 53.14     47.25     51.98     
IF 99.9972     99.9978     99.9975     
NC 0.99999     0.99902     0.99998     
CQ 139.457     139.578     139.457     
Watson-Distance 31.415     59.788     31.499     
 
alpha0=1.53, 
beta=0.8,   
alpha=0.2 
Lattice 
alpha0, beta 
Block-Wise 
alpha 
Combined 
alpha0,beta,alpha 
MSE 0.557  4.121 0.74 
SNR 44.08 32.97 42.41 
PSNR 51.14 40.54 49.75 
IF 99.9968 99.9482 99.9836 
NC 0.99998 0.99989 0.99997 
CQ 139.784 139.78 139.785 
Watson-Distance 49.145 155.518 50.002 
 
 
In Table 8 are presented the maximum number of bits that can be hosted in the im-
age using the two embedding methods and a combination of them. 
Table 8. Maximum Number of Embedded bits 
 
 Lattice Block-Wise Combined 
Max Embedded Bits 400 6406 >= 4100 
 
We performed a final test in order to verify that in case somebody modifies the 
block-wised part of the eSOM uMatrix illustrated in Figure 3, the decoder realizes the 
modification, informs the user that the authentication application failed and outputs a 
file with the modified blocks marked. The part that is likely to be illegally altered is 
the light area, which illustrates the attack class. In the watermarked version the light 
area representing the existence of attack in a node of the MANET was changed and 
this image was inserted to the decoder in order to verify its authenticity. The authenti-
cation process failed and a marked image was produced (Figure 8). By observing the 
last it is clear that the decoder has successfully located the modified blocks. Therefore 
the whole implementation of the cryptographic encoder-decoder was correct.  
 
 
 
Fig. 8. Marked Image for the Test of the Cryptographic Encoder-Decoder 
7. Conclusions and future work  
In this paper, we have presented an intrusion detection engine that is part of a local 
IDS agent that exist in every node of a MANET. The collaboration of all the local IDS 
agents compose an IDS for MANETs. The proposed intrusion detection engine is 
based on emergent SOMs a special and efficient class of neural networks that gener-
ates as an output a map and provides visual representation of the classification per-
formed. We have examined how eSOM performs in classifying normal and abnormal 
behavior in MANET based on MAC layer features and we exploited the advantage of 
visualizing network traffic. We should note that during the classification procedure 
used in intrusion detection, the classes of the trained data have to be defined manually 
through the observation of the map something that may introduce a process error.  
Using eSOM each node of the MANET creates its local eSOM map as well as the 
global map of its local MANET. The local and global eSOM maps provide us the 
important advantage of being able to have a visual representation of the security status 
of each MANET node as well as  its local MANET. Thus, each node has the option to 
select a secure routing path for packet forwarding by avoiding compromised neigh-
bors. 
It is important to note that for the authentication of the local as well as the global 
maps an innovative and efficient watermarking method is proposed which derives 
from the combination of two watermarking embedding methods, the Lattice and the 
Block-Wise. The combined and proposed watermarking method exploits the ad-
vantages of the Lattice and the Block-Wise method in order to produce the most effi-
cient and reliable results. The most sensitive part of the eSOM map that represents the 
existence of an attack in a node being the most sensitive part of the map is water-
marked with the block-wise method and the rest of the map with the lattice embedding 
method. 
We exploit the significant advantages of visual representation and watermarking in 
MANET, two research areas that have not previously used in the research field of 
MANET.  Special attention should be paid to the fact that the detection engine could 
be employed to various routing protocols. Regarding possible extension of this work, 
we plan to select features from other layers (e.g. network layer) in order to examine 
the performance of the proposed approach for the detection of other type of attacks. 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] J. Seitz, Digital Watermarking for Digital Media, Information Science Publishing, ISBN: 
1591405181, 2005. 
 
[2] Q. Zhang, New techniques for Digital Watermarking, ProQuest / UMI, ISBN: 0542283778, 
2006-12-13. 
 
[3] T. Furon, A survey of Watermarking Security, Digital Watermarking: 4h International 
Workshop (IWDW), LNCS Proceedings, Italy, (2005), pp. 201-215. 
 
[4] Y. Zhang, W. Lee, Y. Huang, “Intrusion Detection Techniques for Mobile Wireless Net-
works”, Wireless Networks  9 (2003), pp. 545-556. 
 
[5] Y. Huang, and W. Lee, “A Cooperative Intrusion Detection System for Ad Hoc Networks”, 
in Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Security of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks,  Oc-
tober (2003), pp. 135-147. 
 
[6] H. Deng, Q. Zeng, and D. P. Agrawal, “SVM-based Intrusion Detection System for Wire-
less Ad Hoc Networks”, In Proceedings of the IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference 
(VTC’03), 3 (2003), pp. 2147-2151. 
 
[7] O. Kachirski, and R. Guha, “Intrusion Detection Using Mobile agents in wireless Ad hoc 
Networks”, in Proceedings of the IEEE workshop on Knowledge Media Networking, (2002) 
pp.153-158. 
 
[8] Y. Liu, Y. Li, H. Man, “MAC Layer Anomaly Detection in Ad Hoc Networks”, In Proceed-
ings of 6th IEEE Information Assurance Workshop, June 17, 2005. 
 
[9] Y. Huang, W. Fan, W. Lee, P.Yu, “Cross-Feature analysis for Detecting Ad-Hoc Routing 
Anomalies”, In Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Distributed Computing 
Systems, (2003) pp. 478. 
 
[10] C.Y. Tseng, P. Balasubramanyan,  R. Limprasittiporn, J. Rowe, and K. Levitt, “A specifi-
cation-based Intrusion Detection system for AODV”, In Proceedings of the 1st ACM work-
shop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks, (2003) pp. 125-134. 
  
[11] F. Anjum, D. Subhadrabandhu, S. Sarkar, “Signature-based Intrusion Detection for Wire-
less Ad-Hose Networks”, In Proceedings of Vehicular Technology Conference, Wireless 
Security Symposium, Orlando, Florida, (2003) 
 
[12] T. M. Chen, V. Venkataramanan, “Dempster-Shafer Theory for Intrusion Detection in Ad 
Hoc Networks”, IEEE Internet Computing, Vol. 9, Issue 6 (November 2005), pp. 35-41. 
 
[13] X. Wang, D.S. Reeves, S.F. Wu, J. Yuill, “Sleepy watermark tracing: an active network-
based intrusion response framework”, In Proceedings of the 16th International Conference 
of Information Security (IFIP/SEC’01), Paris, France. 
 
[14] R. Páez, C. Satizábal, J. Forné, “Cooperative Itinerant Agents (CIA): Security Scheme for 
Intrusion Detection Systems”, In Proceedings of the International Conference on Internet 
Surveillance & Protection (ICISP ’06), (2006) p. 26. 
 
[15] S. Haykin, “Neural Networks: A comprehensive Foundation”, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 
USA, 2nd edition (1999).  
 
[16] A. Ultsch, “Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery with Emergent SOFMs for Multivari-
ate Time Series”, In Kohonen Maps, (1999) pp. 33-46. 
 
[17] A. Ultsch, “Maps for visualization of high-dimensional Data Spaces”, Proc. WSOM, 
Kyushu, Japan, (2003) pp. 225-230. 
 
[18] A. Ultsch, F. Moerchen “ESOM-Maps: tools for clustering, visualization, and classifica-
tion with Emergent SOM”, Tech. Report Dept. of Mathematics and Computer Science, Uni-
versity of Marburg, Germany, (46) (2005). 
 
[19] Databionic ESOM Tools, Available from <http://databionic-esom.sourceforge.net/devel.html> 
